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The international community has been more hesitant in accounting for the environmental
consequences of war. All that the international community has been able to negotiate is scattered
collateral references in a variety of treaties and conventions. One immediate task will be to consol-
idate these references into a single document or treaty. A more daunting task, of which this easy
shall provide a brief overview, is to develop a mechanism to ensure compliance with these stan-
dards, to deter deviation therefrom, and to allocate responsibility for wrongdoing. More specifi-
cally, this essay considers the ability of the International Criminal Court to perform such a task.
When all is said and done, the International Criminal Court may not be particularly well-suited
to sanction environmentally destructive behavior. This proposition runs counter to the thinking
that international humanitarian law may offer the possibility of an effective response to wartime
environmental destruction.
ESSAY
WAGING WAR AGAINST THE WORLD: THE
NEED TO MOVE FROM WAR CRIMES TO
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
Mark A. Drumbl*
When two elephants fight, it's always the grass that gets hurt.1
INTRODUCTION
Over the past century, the international community has
shown considerable concern for the humanitarian consequences
of war. Examples of this concern include the adoption of the
four Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War,2 public sanction
of the use of land-mines,3 and the creation of non-partisan inter-
national criminal courts enforcing the 1948 Genocide Conven-
tion4 in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.5 Negotiations that
* Associate-in-Law, Columbia University School of Law; B.A. (First Class Honors),
1989, McGill University; M.A., 1992, Institut d'6tudes politiques de Paris/McGill Univer-
sity; LL.B. (Honors), 1994, University of Toronto. This essay is a revised version of a
paper presented at the First International Conference on Addressing the Environmen-
tal Consequences of War: Legal, Economic and Scientific Perspectives (Washington,
D.C.,June 10-12, 1998). Appreciations to Caroline Presber for her invaluable assistance
and Carl Bruch (Environmental Law Institute) for helpful suggestions.
1. African proverb cited in BEN JACKSON, POVERTY AND THE PLANET 150 (1990).
2. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 377-85 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff
eds., 2d ed. 1989), for the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949; the
1949 Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea; the 1949 Geneva Convention
III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; and the 1949 Geneva Convention IV
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. All Conventions are
reprinted in consolidated form in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR. Id.
3. See, e.g.,, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indis-
criminate Effects, infra note 47, specifically Protocols II and III thereof.
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
5. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was created by
virtue of United Nations Security Council Resolution 808 of February 22, 1993. S.C.
Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48'" Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993). The Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created by virtue of United Nations Security
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have just concluded have established a permanent International
Criminal Court, principally designed to adjudicate genocide and
crimes against humanity.6
The international community has been more hesitant in ac-
counting for the environmental consequences of war. This re-
luctance exists notwithstanding the severity of often intentionally
inflicted military damage to the environment. In a sense, this
reluctance is no surprise. Modification and desecration of the
natural environment is seen by many as a strategic mechanism to
safeguard state sovereignty. Roman soldiers salted the soil of
Carthage, Agent Orange was used to defoliate the Vietnamese
jungle, and oil was dumped into the Persian Gulf to contaminate
Kuwait's water supply.7 In large part, such activity remains per-
missible because there is no definitive or readily enforceable
code of conduct governing what warring parties can and cannot
do to the environment. All that the international community
has been able to negotiate is scattered collateral references in a
variety of treaties and conventions.8 At most, these references
provide some definitional parameters as to what constitutes un-
acceptable treatment of the environment in times of war.
Notwithstanding the often limited and ambiguous scope of these
definitions, they do provide a starting point for a more pro-
tracted discussion. One immediate task will be to consolidate
these references into a single document or treaty. A more
daunting task, of which this essay shall provide a brief overview,
is to develop a mechanism to ensure compliance with these stan-
Council Resolution 955 of November 8, 1994. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49"' Sess.,
3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
6. UNITED NATIONS, DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF AN INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, ROME STATUTE ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) (adopted by United Nations on July 17,
1998) (visited Aug. 4, 1998) <http://www.un.org/icc> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) [hereinafter ROME STATUTE].
7. It is estimated that one-third of Vietnam is wasteland as a result of extensive
defoliation practices. See Oscar Arias, Responsibility of Nations to the Environment, in PROC.
OF THE FIRST INT'L CONF. ON ADDRESSING ENvrL. CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECON.
AND SCI. PERSPECTIVES (June 10-12, 1998). As regard the Kuwaiti situation, see Public
Authority for Assessment of Compensation of Damages Resulting from Iraqi Aggres-
sion, Oil and Environmental Claims Bulletin (Aug. 1997) [hereinafter Oil Bulletin]. In-
dependent of the damage to Kuwait and to the Persian Gulf waters, it is estimated that
the oil well fires set by Iraqi soldiers expelled one to two million tons of carbon dioxide,
which in 1991 represented one percent of total global carbon dioxide emissions. Id. at
8.
8. See infra notes 12-54 and accompanying text.
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dards, to deter deviation therefrom, and to allocate responsibil-
ity for wrongdoing.9 More specifically, this essay considers the
ability of the International Criminal Court to perform such a
task. When all is said and done, the International Criminal
Court may not be particularly well-suited to sanction environ-
mentally destructive behavior. This proposition runs counter to
the thinking that international humanitarian law may offer the
possibility of an effective response to wartime environmental de-
struction.°
I. THE ENVIRONMENT AND WAR: WHAT STANDARDS HAVE
WE NEGOTIATED SO FAR?
Environmental protection is heralded as a laudable goal by
a broad variety of international agreements.1 Only a small sub-
set of these agreements demonstrates any consensus on what
constitutes acceptable or unacceptable use of the environment
as a tool of war. It is only very recently that the international
community has made tentative inroads into contemplating the
prosecution of those who engage in an unacceptable use of the
environment during wartime. In this latter regard, the language
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
12
("Rome Statute") is important.
Under the language of the Rome Statute, intentional inflic-
tion of harm to the environment may constitute a "war crime.
13
9. Many commentators opine that the development of adequate implementation
should be a priority for future discussions. See, e.g., Antoine Bouvier, Recent Studies on
the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict, 291 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF
THE RED CROss 554-66 (Nov.-Dec. 1992). The International Committee of the Red
Cross, together with other organizations, has advocated that the International Criminal
Court be the forum to prohibit and to punish environmental war crimes. See First Int'l
Conf. on Addressing Envtl. Consequences of War: Legal, Econ. and Sci. Perspectives,
Addressing Environmental Consequences of War, Background Paper, 17 (June 10-12, 1998)
[hereinafter Background Paper]. It is in response to this quest for an appropriate forum
that the possibilities of the International Criminal Court to fulfill such a function ought
to be reviewed.
10. See Neil A.F. Popovic, Humanitarian Law, Protection of the Environment, and
Human Rights, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 67-68, 87-89 (1995) (stating that humani-
tarian law and human rights can, with some modification, be expanded to cover war-
time environmental damage).
I. There are over 900 international agreements that purport to protect the envi-
ronment. See Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance with International En-
vironmental Agreements, 27 ENVTL. POL'V & L. 297, 297 (1997).
12. ROME STATUTE, supra note 6.
13. Article 5(1)(c) vests the court with jurisdiction over "war crimes." Id. art.
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Article 8, which defines "war crimes", however, limits the juris-
diction of the International Criminal Court to "war crimes in
particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part
of a large-scale commission of such crimes."14 To this end, there
is an immediate question whether isolated incidents will even fall
within the purview of the Rome Statute. A more important limi-
tation, however, is the fact that prohibiting harm to the natural
environment is only explicitly mentioned once in the entire
Rome Statute. 5 In this regard, Article 8(2) (b) (iv) prohibits:
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage antic-
ipated. 16
5(1)(c). The definition of "war crimes" is provided by Article 8, which at one point
makes reference to "widespread, long-term and severe" harm to the environment. Id.
art. 8. The scope of this provision is discussed below. Articles 5(1)(d) and 5(2) also
create jurisdiction over "crimes of aggression." Id. art. 5(1) (d), (2). The definition of
this term, however, is not provided. In fact, the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court ("Rome Statute") leaves it to the parties to define this term in the fu-
ture. Those concerned with environmental issues may view the open-ended nature of
"crimes of aggression" as a potential device to expand the International Criminal
Court's jurisdiction over environmental matters.
14. Id. art. 8(1).
15. In other places, Article 8 prohibits as a "war crime" conduct that may be collat-
erally related to the well-being of the natural environment, or have some other ancillary
connection. Examples include Article 8(2) (a) (iv), which sanctions "extensive destruc-
tion and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly." Id. art. 8(2) (a) (iv). Article 8(2) (b) prohibits other serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the
established framework of international law, namely:
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against . . .installations, [or] material
... involved in a humanitarian assistance or a peacekeeping mission;
(v) Attacking or bombarding ... dwellings or buildings which are unde-
fended and which are not military objectives;
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against . . . [inter alia] historic monu-
ments;
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place; [and]
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by
depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival.
Id. art. 8(2)(b).
16. United Nations Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, (2 April 1998), section B(b) to the "War Crimes" section of Part 2 (emphasis
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The negotiation history of Article 8(2) (b) (iv) merits a brief
review. The draft version of the Rome Statute ("Draft Rome
Statute") which served as the basis for the final negotiations
listed three other options along with the language which was
eventually adopted in Article 8(2) (b) (iv). The three rejected
options were:
1. Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that
such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to ci-
vilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment which
is not justified by military necessity; or
2. Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that
such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to ci-
vilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment; or
3. No paragraph [in other words, no prohibition on inten-
tionally inflicting widespread, long-term and severe dam-
age to the natural environment].
In the end, the provision that was adopted was a compro-
mise and, from an environmental perspective, occupies a middle
ground. As shall be discussed in Section I(C), however, it shares
with the first option the important limitation that global envi-
ronmental integrity is secondary to national security interests.
Article 8(2) (b) (iv) triggers numerous interpretive concerns.
It is to a consideration of these that this essay now turns. By way
of overview, there are three principal components to the lan-
guage of Article 8(2) (b) (iv): (1) the actual physical act, or actus
reus, which consists of inflicting "widespread, long-term and se-
vere damage" to the natural environment; (2) the mental ele-
ment, or mens rea, namely that the infliction of this harm must
be done intentionally and with knowledge that the attack will
create "widespread, long-term and severe damage" to the natural
environment; and (3) even if both the physical and mental ele-
ments are found, military advantage can operate as a defense to
criminal wrongdoing.
A. The Physical Act: Widespread, Long-term and Severe Damage
A successful prosecution under the Rome Statute will, first
added) <http://www.un.org/icc/part2.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) [hereinafter Draft Rome Statute].
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and foremost, have to show that the accused committed "wide-
spread, long-term and severe" damage to the natural environ-
ment. Of great importance is that all three elements must con-
junctively be proven. The language of "widespread, long-term
and severe" has woven its way into other international agree-
ments relating to the use of the environment in times of war, for
example Article I of the 1977 United Nations Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmen-
tal Modification Techniques1 7 ("ENMOD Convention") and the
1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention ("Protocol I").18
To this end, the Rome Statute may not advance environmental
concerns beyond the progress made in these prior documents.
In fact, by providing that all three elements must be conjunc-
tively shown to exist, this language regresses from the wording of
the ENMOD Convention, which bases liability disjunctively on
proof of only one of these three characteristics.
What exactly do "widespread," "long-term," and "severe"
mean? The Rome Statute is silent on this point. Some interpre-
17. U.N. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333 (entered into
force Oct. 5, 1978), which prohibits engagement "in military ... environmental modifi-
cation techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of de-
struction, damage, or injury to any other State Party." The U.N. Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tech-
niques ("ENMOD Convention") is of more limited scope than Protocol I on the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I]. It is limited
to warfare among signatories, whereas Protocol I prescribes any method of warfare in-
tended to cause environmental damage; additionally, the ENMOD Convention focuses
on the use of the environment as a weapon. As a result, wanton destruction of the
environment occurring as a byproduct of a military campaign might not fall within its
parameters. Some of the activities prohibited by the ENMOD Convention amount to
outrageous behavior not within the military capability of most nations: for example
inducing earthquakes and tidal waves, or activating quiescent volcanoes. As a result,
these activities may not be real threats, and the ENMOD Convention prohibitions may
be more apparent than real.
18. Protocol I, supra note 17. Article 35(3) prohibits "methods or means of war-
fare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and se-
vere damage to the natural environment." Id. art. 35(3). Article 55 states that: "Care
shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-
term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition on the use of methods
or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to
the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the popula-
tion. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited." See
arts. 54, 56 (providing for protection of property, which has ancillary benefits for envi-
ronment). The United States has not yet ratified Protocol I.
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tive guidance can be provided by the work of the Geneva Confer-
ence of the Committee on Disarmament Understanding ("CCD
Understanding") regarding the application of these terms in the
ENMOD Convention. 19 This additional work was necessary be-
cause the ENMOD Convention does not itself define these
terms. The CCD Understanding provides as follows:
"widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several
hundred square kilometers;
"long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or approxi-
mately a season;
"severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm
to human life, natural and economic resources or other as-
sets.
20
Regrettably, the interpretive value of the CCD Understand-
ing is curtailed by the fact that it stipulates that its use is limited
to the ENMOD Convention and is not intended to prejudice the
interpretation of similar terms if used in another international
agreement. 2 As it turns out, greater interpretive guidance may
be obtained from commentaries on Protocol I, especially be-
cause the language of this protocol is, like the Rome Statue, con-
junctive in nature. From an environmental perspective, the
prohibitions in Protocol I are more circumscribed than those of
the ENMOD Convention. For example, "long-term" has been
interpreted as meaning "lasting for decades. '22
To this end, it will be important to develop a memorandum
of understanding under the Rome Statute in which the scope of
"widespread," "long-term," and "severe" is spelled out. In doing
so, it will be important to go beyond the language of the EN-
MOD Convention. For starters, the "widespread" and "long-
term" principles attempt to ascribe temporal and geographic
limitations on environmental harm that, for the most part, does
not know such boundaries. "As the planet constitutes one single
ecosystem, environmental degradation of one part of the earth
19. Understanding I of the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament [here-
inafter CCD Understanding], reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAw OF WAR, supra note 2.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Jozef Goldblat, The Mitigation of Environmental Disruption by War: Legal Ap-
proaches, in ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS OF WAR: RELEASING DANGEROUS FORCES IN AN IN-
DUSTRIALIZED WORLD 48, 52 (Arthur Westing ed. 1990).
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ultimately affects the entire planet. '23 On another note, the "se-
vere" requirement could mean that damage to an isolated sec-
tion of the global commons whose natural resources have not yet
been valued by global financial markets could escape punish-
ment and this notwithstanding its biodiversity or species-impor-
tance. The anthropocentric limitation of "severe" damage to
that which affects human life and human consumption of natu-
ral resources underscores a more general shortcoming with the
existing framework of environmental protection during wartime,
namely that this protection is not geared to protecting the envi-
ronment per se, but, rather, humanity's need to make use of it. 24
Our thinking in this regard may not have significantly
progressed beyond the following words of the book of Deuteron-
omy:
When you are at war, and lay siege to a city for a long time in
order to take it, do not destroy its trees by taking the axe to
them, for they provide you with food; you shall not cut them
down. The trees of the field are not men that you should
besiege them. But you may destroy or cut down any trees that
you know do not yield food, and use them in 'siege-works
against the city that is at war with you, until it falls. 25
In the end, it may be preferable to reduce the threshold of
responsibility not to "widespread, long-term and severe" harm,
but instead to "harm" more generally. The amplitude of the
harm would instead inform sentencing principles, as opposed to
culpability. A paradigm shift would focus on the environment as
the victim of the harm, not humanity. Given that conjunctive
language has woven its way into the Rome Statute, it will be nec-
23. Lynn Berat, Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a Crime of Geo-
cide in International Law, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 327, 348 n.102 (1993).
24. For example, Article 8(2) (b) (xxv) of the Rome Statute, prohibits as a method
of warfare the intentional use of starvation of civilians through the deprivation of ob-
jects indispensable to their survival. ROME STATUTE, supra note 6, art. 8(2) (b) (xxv).
Although tactics such as "scorched earth" and "defoliation" have been used to starve
civilians and thereby to dissuade their helping insurgency movements, the Rome Stat-
ute does not criminalize the destruction of the earth but, rather, the denial of a type of
the earth's resources to civilian populations. In other words, the destruction of land
that does not provide food would not be cognizable within the Rome Statute unless the
conditions of Article 8(2) (b) (iv) were met. Id. art. 8(2) (b) (iv). As shall be discussed
below, there may even be a requirement that, in order for environmental harm to be
"severe" (and hence be caught by Article 8(2)(b)(iv)), it must simultaneously affect
humanity.
25. Deuteronomy 20: 19-20.
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essary for environmental public interest groups to involve them-
selves in any litigation in order for the International Criminal
Court to arrive at an informed and environmentally sensitive de-
cision. This involvement would represent quite a turnaround
given the limited presence of environmental public interest
groups at the Rome Statute negotiations. The question, by now
academic, that is left hanging is whether a greater presence of
such groups at the negotiations could have resulted in the inte-
gration of stronger provisions safeguarding the environment.
B. The Mental Element: Strict Intentionality
Criminal behavior is evaluated not only on the actual physi-
cal act, but also on the mind-set of the criminal when the act was
committed. In some cases, for example driving while intoxi-
cated, governments have made a policy decision to mete out
criminal sanctions simply through the physical element: if one is
intoxicated, for example eighty milligrams of alcohol in 100 mil-
liliters of blood, criminal liability attaches. It does not matter
whether or not the accused knew that he or she was above the
limit, or intended to be above the limit. In other situations, a
similar physical act, for example homicide, will be treated differ-
ently depending on the mind-set of the accused and the circum-
stances surrounding the crime. Planning the death of an indi-
vidual will trigger significantly more severe consequences than
accidentally or negligently causing someone's death.
In the case of Article 8(2) (b) (iv), criminal sanction will only
fall upon the most invidious offender: the individual who knows
his or her behavior will cause "widespread, long-term and severe"
damage to the environment and, notwithstanding proof of this
knowledge, still commits the act with the full intention of caus-
ing the environmental damage. Proof that someone did not
know that the act would commit "widespread, long-term and se-
vere" damage would, under the present wording, be sufficient to
absolve that individual from criminal sanction. To this end, the
language of Article 8(2) (b) (iv) is very narrow. Because there is
no liability for negligently or carelessly inflicting "widespread,
long-term and severe" damage to the environment means that
persons who are found to act negligently will not face any crimi-
nal or civil sanction at all.
Greater detail as to the intentions of the negotiating parties
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emerges from footnotes in the Draft Rome Statute. 6 These foot-
notes reinforce the conclusion that a significant mental element
is required to ground culpability. The negotiators "accept that it
will be necessary to insert a provision... which sets out the ele-
ments of knowledge and intent which must be found to have
existed for an accused to be convicted of a war crime. '2 7 An
accused's actions are to be evaluated in light of the "relevant
circumstances of, and information available to, the accused at
the time."2 Given this defense, it will be important to educate
military and political officials in both developing and developed
nations as to the environmentally harmful effects of certain types
of warfare and to disseminate the technologies to avoid reliance
on such strategies in the first place. In this regard, the work of
the International Committee of the Red Cross29 ("ICRC") can
play a pivotal role. The ICRC has published a document entitled
Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of
the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict,3" which sets forth
guidelines ("Environment Guidelines") that are:
[i]ntended as a tool to facilitate the instruction and training
of armed forces in an often neglected area of international
humanitarian law: the protection of the natural environment.
The Guidelines['] . . . sole aim is to contribute in a practical
and effective way to raising awareness .... [T] hey are an
instrument for dissemination purposes.
26. See Draft Rome Statute, supra note 16.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See International Committee of the Red Cross (visited Oct. 27, 1998) <http://
www.icrc.org/unicc/icrcnews.nsf/Doclndex/home> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional LawJournal). The International Committee of the Red Cross coordinates interna-
tional relief activities and promotes the strengthening of humanitarian law. Id.
30. See Follow to the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims
(1993) (visited Apr. 4, 1998) <http://www.icrc.org/unicc/icrcnews.nsf/8> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Environment Guidelines].
31. Follow-up to the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, 311 INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 230-37 (Mar. 1, 1996); published as an annex to
U.N. Doc. A/49/323 (1994) <http://www.icrc.org/unicc/icrcnews.nsf/8> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal). The United Nations General Assembly invited
all states to disseminate widely the Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the
Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict and to give due consideration to
the possibility of incorporating them into their military manuals. See United Nations Dec-
ade of International Law, G.A. Res. 49/50, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 136, art. 11, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/49/50 (1995); see also SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MAN-
UAL] (providing restatement of law applicable to armed conflicts at sea). Many of the
1998]
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The Environment Guidelines provide in relevant part that "de-
struction of the environment not justified by military necessity
violates international humanitarian law . . .under certain cir-
cumstances, such destruction is punishable as a grave breach of
international humanitarian law. ''3 2 The Environment Guidelines
state that its guidelines are drawn from existing international
legal obligations and, as such, constitute a baseline of jus com-
mune among nations." Many detailed rules are provided in Arti-
cle 111(9) of the Environment Guidelines, which cover numerous
issues ranging from barring incendiary weapons in forested re-
gions to precluding the use of naval mines. 4 These rules trans-
late often vague international norms into daily practice.
Ultimately, it is hoped that the Environment Guidelines could
constitute the level of objective knowledge imputed to all mili-
tary and civilian leaders and agents for purposes of culpability
under international criminal legislation. 5 It is also hoped that
they will be taken into account as new weaponry is developed. In
this latter regard, Article IV(18) of the Environment Guidelines is
particularly important:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new
weapon, means or method of warfare, states are under an ob-
ligation to determine whether its employment would, in some
or all circumstances, be prohibited by applicable rules of in-
ternational law, including these providing protection of the
environment in times of armed conflict.3 6
The international community ought to consider developing a
permanent body to ensure that these investigations are under-
taken, and that their results adhered to. It is important not to
principles in the SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO ARMED CON-
FLICTS AT SEA are encapsulated in the general provisions of the Environment Guidelines.
32. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 31, art. 111(8). Article III(11) prohibits "meth-
ods of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the natural environment and thereby prejudice the health or
survival of the population." Id. art. III(11).
33. Id. art. 1(1).
34. Environment Guidelines, supra note 30, art. 111(9).
35. Some militaries, for example Germany's and the U.S. Navy, have already incor-
porated some of these guidelines into rules of engagement, operational instructions,
and targeting manuals. For a thorough discussion of the integration of these rules into
the practices of the U.S. Navy, see Captain John P. Quinn et al., Environmental Protection
in Naval Operations, in PROC. OF THE FIRST INT'L CONF. ON ADDRESSING ENVTL. CONSE-
QUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECON. AND SCI. PERSPECTIVES (JUNE 10-12, 1998).
36. Environment Guidelines, supra note 30, art. IV(18).
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take for granted that technologically sophisticated weaponry is
necessarily less injurious to the environment. For example,
some analysis of U.S. involvement in the Gulf War reveals that
"surgical bombing" may be more a myth than reality.3"
In conclusion, unless some level of objective knowledge is
read into the intentionality requirement, individuals who choose
not to inform themselves that what they are doing might be dele-
terious for the environment might be able to claim ignorance as
a full defense. A failure to incorporate an objective element into
the Rome Statute's environmental war crimes also represents a
step backwards insofar as Protocol I had, as early as 1977,
grounded responsibility not in intentional environmental harm,
but simply when there was a reasonable expectation that envi-
ronmental damage would occur.38
C. Avoiding Criminal Sanction Through Proof of Militay Advantage
Even if there is "intentional, widespread long-term," and se-
vere damage to the natural environment, liability is only found if
this damage is "clearly excessive" in relation to the concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated. This limitation on
culpability is a somewhat diluted version of the doctrine of "mili-
tary necessity," a long-standing customary principle of the Law of
War that has, in the past, been used to mitigate or to eliminate
responsibility often for grievous breaches of humanitarian stan-
dards. In short, "military necessity" is:
[a] subjective doctrine which 'authorizes' military action
when such action is necessary for the overall resolution of a
conflict, particularly when the continued existence of the act-
37. See Francis Kelly, The Commission of Inquiry for the International War Crimes
Tribunal, War Crimes Committed Against the People of Iraq (visited on June 30, 1998)
<http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-warc.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal) ("President Bush popularized the myth of a clean war against Iraq .... In the end,
70 percent of the bombs dropped on Iraq missed their intended targets .... Witnesses
to the destruction said that the ... bombing leveled entire blocks of civilian homes.");
see also Paul Walker, The Commission of Inquiry for the International War Crimes Tri-
bunal, U.S. Bombing: The Myth of Surgical Bombing in the Gulf War (visited on June 30,
1998) <http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-warc.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) ("Despite all these public proclamations about limited casualties from so-called
surgical and precision strikes there would appear to be much greater destruction and
much higher numbers of dead and injured in Iraq and Kuwait"). Paul Walker docu-
ments the use of fuel air explosives and carpet bombing by the U.S. forces and suggests
these military practices infringed international legal norms. Id.
38. Background Paper, supra note 9, at 5.
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ing state would otherwise be in jeopardy.39 When the exist-
ence . . . of a state stands in unavoidable conflict with such
state's treaty obligations, the latter must give way, for the self-
preservation and development.., of the nation are the pri-
mary duties of every state. 40
"Military necessity" is a slippery-slope that has justified a
broad array of environmentally destructive conduct. By way of
example, the 1907 Hague Convention's environmental protec-
tion provisions have been largely eroded by the doctrine of mili-
tary necessity. Florencio Yuzon relates the following example:
[I]n the Second World War, the German General Lothar
Rendulic adopted a scorched earth policy in Norway in order
to evade advancing Russian troops. General Rendulic or-
dered the evacuation of all inhabitants in the province of
Finmark, and destroyed all villages and surrounding facilities.
The Nuremberg Military Tribunal charged general Rendulic
with wanton destruction of property, but later acquitted him
on the basis that military necessity justified his actions in light
of the military situation as he perceived it at the time."1
Although one step removed from a blanket exemption for
"military necessity," Article 8(2) (b) (iv)'s use of "military advan-
tage" shares many of these same drawbacks. More pointedly,
however, there are also concerns as to the effectiveness of the
specific language arrived at by the negotiating parties in Article
8(2) (b)(iv). Firstly, although a "proportionality test"-i.e., the
environmental damage must be "clearly excessive" in relation to
the military advantage-is established, no guidelines, defini-
tions, or examples of "clearly" or "excessive" are provided. To
this end, initial decisions by the International Criminal Court
will be important in setting the scope for "clearly excessive."
From this judicial discretion there emerges a risk that a very high
threshold will be required. The factual element of the "propor-
tionality test" is also unclear: because proof of "clearly excessive"
39. Mark J.T. Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern War-
fare: Customary Substance over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AIF. L. REv. 479, 496
(1993).
40. BURLEIGH CUSHING RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 44 (1928).
41. Ensign Florencio J. Yuzon, Deliberate Environmental Modification Through the Use
of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Greening" the International Laws of Armed Conflict to
Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 793, 815
(1996).
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is required in order to find someone guilty, and because the
onus of proof rests with the prosecutor, what type of research
and data will have to be marshaled? Secondly, other adjectival
terms such as "concrete," "direct," and "overall" military advan-
tage are vague and, for the most part, fairly novel in the interna-
tional legal context. Once again, it is unclear what meaning will
be ascribed to these qualifying terms. Thirdly, the military ad-
vantage needs simply to be "anticipated." It is unclear by whom
and according to what standards the "anticipation" is to be
judged. Does there have to be an objective element to the antici-
pation, or can the belief be unrealistic? As with the intentional-
ity requirement, if the notion of military advantage remains sub-
jective in the mind of the military or political leader under the
circumstances in which the tactical decision was made, then the
defense could be widely available. In order to curtail misuse of
the defense, it will be important to establish some objective stan-
dards as to when the environment may be destroyed in order to
salvage national sovereignty.
More profoundly, the time may have come to question
whether humanity's recourse to physical aggression to settle na-
tional or local disputes ought ever to trump environmental in-
tegrity. Such an examination would involve a reinterpretation of
the interaction between international environmental law and the
Law of War. Certain practices, such as genocide and torture,
have been sanctioned as illegal by the international community
to the extent that they can never be undertaken even if essential
to defend national sovereignty. Why should intentional environ-
mental desecration not be similarly proscribed?
The international community's decision to criminalize the
wilful infliction of "widespread, long-term, and severe damage to
the natural environment" is cause for limited celebration, con-
siderable disappointment, and some concern. The disappoint-
ment flows from the fact that such conduct is already "prohib-
ited" by virtue of Protocol I and the ENMOD Convention.
Nonetheless, the Rome Statute may well provide a more viable
mechanism to sanction this illegal conduct. It is an important
step for the international community to actually criminalize this
conduct, which it has never done before. Nonetheless, as we
have seen, it is unclear how difficult it will be to prove "wide-
spread, long-term and severe" damage; proof will be rendered
more problematic by the fact that the provision appears conjunc-
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tive. In the end, these potential difficulties may denude the pro-
hibition of much practical effect. Additionally, the environmen-
tal war crime could possibly be interpreted as requiring a very
significant level of knowledge, intentionality, and harm. If di-
rect knowledge is required, then behavior could no longer be
sanctioned on an objective basis, and ignorance of the law could
serve as a defense. This type of knowledge requirement would
be less than desirable as environmental education and trans-
parency of knowledge would be discouraged. Requiring direct
knowledge of the environmental war crime may also create some
tension with Article 28's evaluation of command responsibility
along objective standards. If intention is required, then how
could a commander be liable for the activities of subordinates
not known to the commander at the time? The wording of Arti-
cle 8(2) (b) (iv) appears to preclude a commander's liability for
environmental desecration that the commander "ought to have
known" about but did not, even if this ignorance is due to wan-
ton disregard.
On another note, the environmental war crimes provisions
of the Rome Statute do not apply to internecine, as opposed to
inter-state conflicts.4 2 This limitation is major. Recent events in
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia underscore that the environ-
ment will suffer even in the event of a civil, as opposed to na-
tional war.4" The development of international law applicable to
42. See ROME STATUTE, supra note 6, art. 8(2) (c), (e) (listing types of war crimes
punishable within internal armed conflicts). Intentionally inflicting widespread, long-
term, and severe harm to the environment is omitted from this list. It was explicitly
included within the international armed conflict section in Article 8(2)(b). Id. art.
8(2) (b). Basic principles of treaty interpretation provide that this omission is deliberate
and indicates a desire not to punish environmental desecration when committed in an
internal conflict. Needless to say, further limitations on the application of the entire
Rome Statute to internal conflicts are found in Article 8(2)(f), which provides:
Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character
and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies
to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is
protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups
or between such groups.
Id. art. 8(2) (f) (emphasis added).
In sum, nations appear less willing to support objective standards of criminal behavior
in internal conflicts than in international conflicts. In the end, this reluctance gives rise
to concerns that the protection of both humanity and the environment in internal con-
flicts may be inadequate.
43. Other examples of effect of civil war on the environment include El Salvador
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internal conflicts should be a top priority for policy-makers given
the current dearth of standards in this area." The incipient de-
velopment of a tribunal to investigate war crimes in Cambodia's
internecine violence could present a renewed opportunity to de-
velop and to implement environmental crimes to an internal
conflict.
On the other hand, one of the major successes of the Draft
Statute is that it creates an institution to punish the conduct that
it prohibits. Nonetheless, from the environmental point of view,
the extent to which these "environmental crimes" will receive
the International Criminal Court's attention is uncertain given
the broad array of other crimes to which it will have to direct its
energies. The environmental "war crimes" constitutes one provi-
sion out of dozens in Part 2 of the Rome Statute. Environmental
crimes are not raised as independent crimes; at most, they con-
stitute an add-on in narrowly circumscribed areas. This provi-
sion limits the possibility for future growth and application
within, and outside of, the context of military conflict.45
Article 8 of the Draft Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court also criminalizes the use of certain weapons with
destructive effects on both humanity as well as. on the natural
environment. Prohibited practices include:
8(2) (b) (xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons; and
8(2) (b) (xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other
gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices.4 6
Many of these weapons are already prohibited by other interna-
tional agreements.47 Nonetheless, this codification within the
International Criminal Court shall likely provide a more viable
and Columbia. Insurgency and counter-insurgency guerilla civil wars have a particu-
larly devastating effect on local environments. Insurgents often use tropical forests as
home bases and hiding grounds; counter-insurgency forces often respond by slashing
and burning forests, together with polluting rivers, viewing both as legitimate theaters
of operations.
44. Background Paper, supra note 9, at 5.
45. See the opening language to Article 5 of the Rome Statute, where the jurisdic-
tion of the International Criminal Court is set out. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5.
The International Criminal Court is not given any jurisdiction to address environmen-
tal crimes standing alone.
46. See Draft Rome Statute, supra note 16.
47. See, e.g., U.N. Convention On Prohibitions Or Restrictions On The Use Of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious Or
To Have Indiscriminate Effects, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF 95/15
(1980). Also see conventions in the area of biological and chemical weapons.
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mechanism to enforce compliance than those presently contem-
plated in these other agreements.
The list of enumerated war crimes under 8(2) (b) does not
appear to be exhaustive. After all, Article 8(2) (b) defines as a
war crime "other serious violations of the laws and customs appli-
cable in international armed conflict, within the established
framework of international law, namely, any of the following
acts"48 of which it then lists many, including Article 8(2) (b) (iv).
To this end, there may be some residual room within Article
8(2) (b) to accommodate serious violations of international laws
and customs that are not listed, depending on whether "namely"
is meant to imply exclusivity, which, at first blush, the term does
not seem to suggest. The International Criminal Court may thus
itself decide, based on these laws and customs, whether an
unenumerated act in fact constitutes a war crime. The existence
of this residual jurisdiction is supported by Article 21 of the
Rome Statute.4 9 Article 21(1) states that the International Crim-
inal Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties
and the principles and rules of international law, including the es-
tablished principles of the international law of armed conflict.50
In the interplay between environmental integrity and mili-
tary aggression in the "established principles of the international
law of armed conflict," there are a number of relevant, pre-ex-
isting conventions. These conventions give rise to a corpus of
principles.5 Some of these principles go beyond the categories
48. Draft Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 8(2) (b).
49. ROME STATUTE, supra note 6, art. 21.
50. Id. art. 21(1)(b) (emphasis added).
51. This corpus is composed of both international agreements as well as interna-
tional practices, which constitute customary international law. As to how principles be-
come part of customary international law, Berat offers the following helpful summary:
A principle becomes part of customary international law if: 1) it is widely ad-
hered to by a number of states and is acquiesced in by others; and 2) it is
engaged in out of a sense of obligation. The Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) requires the Court to apply "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law." If the practice is uniform, the
period during which such practice is adhered to before it achieves the status of
customary international law need not be very long.
Berat, supra note 23, at 329-30.
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of conduct expressly prescribed by the Rome Statute, but could
arguably form part of the International Criminal Court's
residual jurisdiction. As a result, if and when environmentally-
related litigation begins under the International Criminal Court,
it will be important to draw the following international treaty
provisions, in addition to Protocol I and the ENMOD Conven-
tion, into any environmental war crimes trial:52
* The World Charter for Nature, Principle 5: Nature shall
be secured against degradation caused by warfare or
other hostile activities.53
" The Rio Declaration, Principle 24: Warfare is inherently
destructive of sustainable development. States shall there-
fore respect international law providing protection for
the environment in times of armed conflict and cooper-
ate in its further development, as necessary.54
* The International Law Commission Draft Articles on
State Responsibility55 creates a limited basis for criminaliz-
ing intentional environmental harms. Article 19(3)(d)
provides that an international crime may result from, inter
alia, a serious breach of an international obligation of es-
sential importance for the safe-guarding and preservation
of the human environment, such as those prohibiting
massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.5 6 This
is one of the few international agreements prior to the
Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court that
demonstrated a willingness to criminalize environmental
52. Some of the listed treaties have not yet been universally ratified. This may
constitute an impediment to full protection of the environment in times of armed con-
flict. In some cases, however, the number of signatories is sufficiently large to substanti-
ate the argument that the contents of the agreements constitute customary interna-
tional law. For example, 147 states are party to Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion, and 139 states are party to Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Convention. See Five
Years After Rio, Written Statement at the United Nations General Assembly, Nineteenth
Special Session, 23-27 June 1997 (visited on Sept. 18, 1998) <http:www.icrc.org/unicc/
icrcnews.nsf> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
53. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR,
37th Sess., Agenda Item 21, 48th plen. mtg., at (I)(5), U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (1982).
54. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/1
(1992).
55. INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION'S DRAr ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
(Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1991).
56. Id. art. 19 (3) (d).
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degradation.57
9 The International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind:58 in familiar
language, Article 20 recognizes some environmental
crimes as "war crimes":
(i) extensive destruction.., of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly;
(ii) employment of poisonous weapons or other weap-
ons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
(iii) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity; and
(iv) in the case of armed conflict, using methods or
means of warfare not justified by military necessity
with the intent to cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment and
thereby gravely prejudice the health or survival of
the population and such damage occurs.59 As re-
gards (iv) above, the Commentaries moderate the
discussion, by emphasizing ,that a violation of this
standard is "not characterized as a grave breach en-
tailing individual criminal responsibility." As a re-
sult, there are readily accessible defenses to liability.
First, "military necessity" constitutes a defense. Sec-
ond, there is also an intentionality requirement,
which requires the intent to cause "gravely prejudi-
cial consequences to the population." In other
words, whether the consequences are gravely preju-
dicial to the environment does not really enter into
57. Other examples include the 1911 Convention for the Preservation of Fur Seals
in the North Pacific, the 1940 Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preserva-
tion in the Western Hemisphere, the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, and the 1973 International Convention for Prevention of
Pollution from Ships.
58. Resolutions And Decisions Adopted By The General Assembly During Its
Thirty-Third Session, G.A. Res. 97, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 220, U.N.
Doc. A/33/45 (1978), amended by G.A. Res. 151, U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 49,
at 292, U.N. Doc. A/42/49 (1987). In the negotiations for the International Criminal
Court, some negotiators suggested that the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind. should be used in the creation of the International Criminal
Court. In the end, this language was adopted. See United Nations Press Release GA/L/
3015 (Nov. 5, 1996).
59. Id. art. 20.
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consideration. Lastly, the damage must have actually
occurred, which means that there can be no liability
for planning or attempting to desecrate the environ-
ment for military purposes.
" The 1907 Hague Regulations,6" Article 22, which states
that it is prohibited "to destroy or seize the enemy's prop-
erty, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war."'" This is one of the
earliest suggestions that there are limits on what a warring
party can do to "property." Although not explicitly men-
tioned, the natural environment can be considered to
constitute "property," although it is unclear whether the
natural environment within the global commons would
fall within the notion of "property" since it is neither pri-
vately nor nationally owned.
* The 1949 Geneva Convention IV,6 2 Article 53: Any de-
struction by the occupying power of real or personal
property belonging individually or collectively to private
persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities,...
is prohibited, except when such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations." As with the
Hague Regulations, this provision is limited by the mili-
tary necessity defense and is inapplicable to the global
commons. Additionally, this provision requires the de-
struction to occur within a nation that is actually occupied
by another. To this end, indiscriminate aerial bombing in
which enemy forces are not occupying the other nation's
territory would fall outside the rubric of Article 53.
* Resolution 687 of the Security Council6 4 was adopted in
the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War and made Iraq ac-
countable for "any direct loss, damage, including environ-
mental damage and the depletion of natural resources...
60. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 22,
36 Stt. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
61. Id.
62. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978, 16
I.L.M. 1391.
63. Id. art. 53.
64. Resolution 687(1991), S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981st mtg., at 7, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/687 (1991).
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as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait." This resolution is an important precedent upon
which to ground civil liability for environmental desecra-
tion eventually. The creation of the United Nations Com-
pensation Commission to value damages and assess liabil-
ity is also an important step in implementing responsibil-
ity for environmental wrongdoing during war-time. It is
estimated that the total environmental damage resulting
from the Iraqi aggression approaches US$40 billion, di-
vided among damage to public health, groundwater re-
sources, terrestrial resources, and marine and coastal re-
sources, and from oil lakes.65
In sum, these fragments, together with the express pro-
nouncements in the Rome Statute, provide some definitional
guidelines as to the permissible use of the environment during
war-time. Unfortunately, they create a "current international
legal framework [that] is vague and unenforceable in environ-
mental matters."66 The background to, and the language of, the
Rome Statute reveal a stagnation in the drive to sanction the use
of the environment as a tool of war. Consideration should be
given to developing ways of going beyond this language.
II. CONSOLIDATING THE FRAGMENTS:
TOWARDS THE CRIME OF ECOCIDE
Some commentators have suggested making it a crime to
recklessly or intentionally harm the environment, both within,
and outside of, the context of war.67 This crime, named geocide
or ecocide, literally a killing of the earth, is the environmental
counterpart of genocide, and would be enshrined in a single in-
ternational convention. The logic of ecocide is as follows: signif-
icantly harming the natural environment constitutes a breach of
a duty of care, and this breach consists, in the least, in tortious or
delictual conduct and, when undertaken with wilfulness, reck-
65. Oil Bulletin, supra note 7, at 14-16.
66. Jesica E. Seacor, Environmental Terrorism: Lessons from the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'V 481, 523 (1994).
67. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, Environmental Disruption by Military Means and Interna-
tional Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY APPRAISAL 33-
51 (1984); Seacor, supra note 66; Mark Allan Gray, The International Crime of Ecocide, 26
CAL. W. INr'L L.J. 215 (1996); Berat, supra note 23; Caggiano, supra note 39; Yuzon,
supra note 41.
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lessness, or negligence, ought to constitute a crime. The ability
of the crime to encompass negligent or wilfully blind conduct is
particularly important. Proof of intentionality, as we have seen,
can be difficult to establish. In this regard, lessons can be
learned from the domestic context. In North America, environ-
mental wrongdoing is generally prosecuted as a public welfare
offense and normally on a negligence standard. In the absence
of legislative intervention to couch environmental desecration as
a "civil offense," positioned between criminal and public welfare
law, it would be difficult for the law to serve as a deterrent to
individuals misusing the natural environment. Given these les-
sons from domestic law, we ought to reevaluate the merit of col-
lapsing environmental wrongdoing within a criminal context
geared to prosecute humanitarian pariahs on an intentionality
basis. Pressing policy considerations of preserving the integrity
of the environment for future generations militate in favor of
attaching liability at a lower standard. As a result, it would be
important for the effectiveness of the ecocide provision to cap-
ture not only the mens rea standard of criminal law, but also neg-
ligence, reasonable foreseeability, willful blindness, carelessness,
and objective certainty standards, many of which animate tort
law and civil liability. By way of example, were a willful blindness
standard to operate, then the nonfeasance of the authorities
who maintained the nuclear reactors involved in the Chernobyl
disaster could be categorized as ecocide. Lynn Berat concludes
that:
there is substantial evidence that although Soviet scientists
and governmental officials were aware that the Soviet nuclear
power plant design was flawed and had the potential for caus-
ing unmitigated disaster, they persisted in maintaining old
plants and built new ones without design modification.6"
It is also important to ground the actus reus not in the exist-
ence of "widespread, long-term and severe" damage, but simply
in the existence of damage per se. If consensus is obtained on
this latter point, Florencio Yuzon points out that:
[in] an international crime of environmental destruction, the
quantum of proof that is necessary, or the threshold of dam-
68. Berat, supra note 23, at 345. Chernobyl is an example of potential ecocidal
conduct in peace-time. See Conclusion as to why this behavior ought to be equally sanc-
tioned by the international community.
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age that must occur, is relatively low compared to ENMOD
and Protocol I where higher thresholds of damage must be
met.... [A]ny damage, regardless of the degree ... would
automatically render the State and/or its military, criminally
liable. 69
The extent of the damage, together with the pervasiveness
of the mental element, would consequently only inform sentenc-
ing principles. If enforcement authorities are given sufficient
discretion in terms of sentencing, then the broader liability pro-
vision can not only be effective, but also respect shared notions
of fundamental justice.
The jurisdiction of an international tribunal would lie in the
transboundary nature of environmental violence, together with
the pernicious effects on the global commons. Any interna-
tional tribunal, however, ought to be guided by the principles of
complementarity in its relationships with national courts. In ne-
gotiating jurisdiction, it is important for an ecocide convention
to apply equally to natural persons, legal persons, public authori-
ties, and states.7° State responsibility is particularly crucial in or-
der for civil damaiges 'and restitution to be viable remedies.7'
Unfortunately, some commentators have focused only on
the definition of ecocide, concluding that "enforcement provi-
sions and machinery ... presently lie within the realm of the-
ory."7 2 As a result, 'much of the existing literature is limited to
discussion of definitional issues. Any right, however, is but theo-
retical without a remedy; there can be no crime without punish-
ment. Thought must be given to how ecocide could be en-
forced, and to what organizations could be optimally suited to
engage in this enforcement. 73 The goal of this essay is to provide
some broad brush strokes in this area, so as to ground future
debate and discussion.
Although there may be a nascent international consensus
that state responsibility for destruction of the environment is a
69. Yuzon, supra note 41, at 841.
70. See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW 189 (1989).
71. This will be discussed infra, at Section IV.
72. Gray, supra note 67, at 217.
73. There is some academic work in this area, though not as prevalent as in the
definitional area. See, e.g., Amedeo Postiglione, A More Efficient International Law on the
Environment and Setting Up an International Court for the Environment Within the United
Nations, 20 ENVTL. L. 321 (1990).
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jus cogens, it is unclear whether the international community
would be prepared to criminalize such destructive behavior
when undertaken in the context of armed conflict beyond the
contours suggested by the Rome Statute. What is clear, however,
is that by failing to try to do so, the international community is
shirking responsibility for one of the principal factors threaten-
ing the integrity of the planet for future generations. Although
the concept of ecocide may sound utopian within the context of
the present framework of reference, this framework needs to be
challenged. After all, the notion of what is politically realistic is,
as it has always been, essentially elastic.
III. ENFORCEMENT AT A CROSSROADS: ECOCIDE WITHIN
AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COURT OR WITHIN
A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
This essay posits that collapsing environmental crimes
within the permanent International Criminal Court might not
be the most effective way to sanction such crimes. One overarch-
ing problem is that the International Criminal Court is princi-
pally designed to punish and to deter genocide and crimes
against humanity per se. As we have seen, environmental offenses
are basically just an add-on and, as a result, might be lost in the
shuffle. An example of this occurred in Rwanda, where the envi-
ronmental desecration of the internecine conflict that has been
ongoing since 1994 is significant. The Rwandan Civil War has
seen two national parks, Parc National des Volcans and Parc Na-
tional de l'Akagera, landmined; 4 endangered species, the
mountain gorillas, poached; agricultural lands rendered barren
in order to coerce the migration of persecuted peoples; and sys-
temic resettlement exhausting moderate lands, specifically in
Eastern Congo, of their agricultural capacities. The ad hoc Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has made no mention of
these issues in its proceedings or in any of the mandates that it
74. It is here that a paradox emerges. There is an interesting correlation between
the placing of landmines and increased biodiversity owing to the fact that mines limit
human encroachment. See Jeffrey McNeely, War and Biodiversity: An Assessment of Im-
pacts, in PROC. OF THE FIRST INT'L CONF. ON ADDRESSING ENVrL. CONSEQUENCES OF WAR:
LEGAL, ECON. AND SCI. PERSPEcrwES (June 10-12, 1998). While warfare is unquestiona-
bly disastrous for most natural habitats, some impacts of war can actually be positive for
biodiversity. McNeely reports that in the demilitarized zone in Korea, which is heavily
landmined, biodiversity has grown. Id.
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has authorized.75 It may very well be that environmental con-
cerns become similarly neglected within the context of an Inter-
national Criminal Court. On another note, the domestic war
crimes prosecutions that are occurring in Rwanda have also
been very reticent in the area of environmental crimes.
Magistrates and judges on an International Criminal Court
will likely not have expertise in the area of environmental law,
policy, or science. This lack of expertise can heighten the trans-
action costs of proceeding judicially,76 as well as produce ineffec-
tive jurisprudence. Were environmental crimes to be litigated in
a separate courtroom that only addressed ecocide and related
infractions, then there could be a greater guarantee of some
level of scientific expertise.
Another critical limitation on the effectiveness of the Rome
Statute is, of course, the fact that China, India, Russia, and the
United States are not parties.77 Clearly, there are many reasons
75. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has been simi-
larly inattentive to environmental concerns.
76. For example, inf the'recent International Court of Justice's decision in Case
Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), the judges had to
be educated in the environmental science aspects of the dispute. (September 25, 1997,
No. 92 General List, <http://wwv.icj-cij.org/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgement/ihsjudcontent.html>)
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). Although there is much to be
gained from educating lay people on environmental issues, this can involve significant
time as well as financial costs. A specialized tribunal could avoid some of these costs.
Making mention of the International Court of Justice begs the question of whether it
could serve as an adjudicator of ecocide disputes. In the past, the International Court
ofJustice has had limited experience with environmental matters, although it has taken
some very important decisions, such as the Nuclear Tests Cases (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974
I.C.J. 253, and Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 16. The International Court of Justice has also recently created an
Environmental Chamber with a view to playing a more proactive role in resolving envi-
ronmental disputes. The principal impediments to the effectiveness of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to adjudicating ecocide are the requirements that (1) both liti-
gants consent to the jurisdiction of the court, which is impractical in an ecocide context
where it is inexorable that one litigant will unwillingly be dragged into court; and (2)
there is no jurisdiction to hear disputes involving individuals.
77. The "opt-out" provision that allows countries to reject the International Crimi-
nal Court's jurisdiction over war crimes for the first seven years of the court's existence
may also serve as a significant limitation on early adjudication under Article
8(2) (b) (iv). See Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Dissents, but Accord Is Reached on War-crime Court
(visited on July 18, 1998) <http://www.nytimes.com> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal). One of the major concerns of the United States was the scope of
the jurisdiction given the International Criminal Court to prosecute war crimes and
crimes against humanity automatically and independently. See A Strong International
Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1998, at A34.
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why these nations chose not to sign on. Some relate to concerns
over Article 15's allocation to the prosecutor of a certain degree
of independence, proprio motu powers; 78 for example, the United
States wished the option to veto the prosecutor's decision to
charge any American citizen. 0 More broadly, some dissenters
wished the United Nations or Security Council to have control
over the International Criminal Court's docket. Other concerns
relate to fears that soldiers will be prosecuted for activities result-
ing out of "international policing" activities.80 What is interest-
ing to consider is whether these same issues would affect the ne-
gotiation of an ecocide convention and, if so, whether the effect
would be notable. In any event, what is clear is that war crimes
writ large is such a thorny area in which to obtain meaningful
international consensus that segregating environmental war
crimes from other types of war crimes may in fact facilitate con-
sensus-building in the environmental arena. As a result, this es-
say suggests that multilateral negotiations be encouraged to de-
velop an ecocide convention that would independently address
environmental concerns. The Convention could be enforced by
a permanent, or, at first, ad hoc international environmental
court."1 In the past, many proponents of crimes against the envi-
ronment have focused on domestic courts as enforcers. For ex-
78. ROME STATUTE, supra note 6, art. 15(1).
79. Permanent War Crimes Court Approved (visited on July 17, 1998) <http://www.
nytimes.com> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The 60-member "like
minded group" that included countries such as Canada, Australia, all European democ-
racies (except France), South Africa, Argentina, and South Korea opposed the U.S.
position during the negotiations.
80. See Stanley, supra note 77; see also Paul Koring, U.S. Qualms over World Court
Called Groundless, THE GLOBE & MAIL, July 24, 1998, at A8 (stating that Washington
wants absolute guarantee that its servicemen could never be brought before new court).
81. The International Green Cross/Green Crescent should be linked with this in-
ternational environmental court. Discussion of an international environmental court is
not new. In fact, the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice has heard suggestions that such a court should be created as a standing body of
the United States. See Gerhard Loibi & Markus Reiterer, Criminal Law and the Protection
of the Environment, 27 ENVrL. POL'v & L. 400 (1997). This proposition, voiced by Costa
Rica, was eventually adopted with the substitution of "appropriate machinery" instead
of "international court." See id. There appeared to be a general consensus that,
although preference may be had for domestic mechanisms to punish environmental
crimes, international criminal law could be applied as an ultima ratio, for the most se-
vere cases of environmental damage. Id. The fact that international legal machinery
has been raised in the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice might make it an interesting starting point for more protracted negotiation on
criminalizing ecocide.
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ample, Article 1(2) of the Environment Guidelines8 2 emphasizes
that "domestic legislation and other measures taken at the na-
tional level are essential means of ensuring that international law
protecting the environment in times of armed conflict is indeed
put into practice."
Perhaps attention should be cast more broadly. An interna-
tional tribunal could settle issues of extraterritoriality, as well as
fulfill a policing role in the areas of the global commons. It
could also ensure some level of environmental protection for the
citizens of nations whose domestic courts fail to sanction ecocide
and other environmental crimes. What is clear, however, is that
any international environmental court will have to operate in
conjunction with national tribunals. Principles of complemen-
tarity between national and international adjudicators that are
now being developed in the area of genocide will also have to be
implemented in the environmental context.8"
Recent scholarship in the area of international relations
shows that conventions with strict liability and rigorous enforce-
ment measures are difficult to negotiate and even more difficult
to enforce, especially when no uniform consensus exists.84 The
trick lies in utilizing more effective and often gradual methods
to stimulate agreement. As a result, discussions related to eco-
cide might be more effective if undertaken within the nexus of a
framework negotiation, as had been the case in climate change,
another urgent area of environmental concern. Instead of fo-
cusing on immediately creating unambiguous rules and strict lia-
bility, an attempt ought to be made to negotiate consensus
around mutually acceptable standards that, through ongoing ne-
gotiations, can eventually be distilled into rules.85 Such negotia-
82. See Environment Guidelines, supra note 30, art. 1(2).
83. Environmental crimes are found within domestic criminal or public welfare
legislation. See Vice President Gore Addresses Issue of Environmental Crimes (visited June 30,
1998) <http://www.mapcruzin.com/scruztri/docs/pl.htm> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal); Committee of Criminal Expertness [sic] of Crimes Against the Envi-
ronment (visited on June 30, 1998) <http://www.zeno.simplenet.com/toppagell.htm>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
84. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYEs, THE NEw SOVEREIGNIY (1995).
85. In many Ways, the failure of the Fifth Geneva Convention on the Protection of
the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict can be attributed to its overly radical
stance. See Hans-Peter Gasser, For Better Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed
Conflict: A Proposal for Action, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 637, 639 (1995). It may be that a desire
to come up with a strong International Criminal Court immediately was a reason that
important parties withheld their consent from the Rome Statute. More promising
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tions should involve not only states, but also non-governmental
organizations, transnational public interest advocates, trading
organizations, and other similar groups. Thought should be
given to establishing a managing secretariat, along with an adju-
dicative body. The managing secretariat is especially important
because it can make decisions between official meetings of the
parties, act in an administrative capacity, suggest policy alterna-
tives, and engage in follow-up investigations.86 As a result, the
ecocide convention would be more than simply a criminal stat-
ute, but an organization designed to enhance awareness and to
develop methods to maximize incentives not to engage in envi-
ronmentally pernicious military initiatives in the first place. It
can also, drawing from the United Nations Compensation Com-
mission, be involved in valuing environmental damage and
perfecting methods of assessment.
IV. WHAT PUNISHMENT?
Penalties are geared to deter misconduct, to restitute the
aggrieved, to voice condemnation, and to offer some rehabilita-
tion for the convicted. These essential sentencing principles
ought to guide those accused of ecocide or any subset of envi-
ronmental war crimes. Part 7 of the Rome Statute offers the
most contemporary compilation of the international commu-
nity's thinking on how international crimes ought to be pun-
ished.17 The punishment provisions of the Rome Statute con-
tain two limitations on the effectiveness of Article 8(2) (b) (iv).
Firstly, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
is limited to natural persons. This limitation makes it impossible
to find any institutional or state liability should it be difficult to
framework approaches have had an inchoate development in the Conference of Ex-
perts on the Use of the Environment as a Tool of Conventional Warfare (Ottawa, July
1992) and previously at the International Council of Environmental Law (Munich, De-
cember 1991). It is hoped that this First Conference on Addressing Environmental
Consequences of War can consolidate these beginnings and set an agenda for the inter-
national political community to establish framework negotiations.
86. See Simon Lyster, Effectiveness of International Regimes Dealing with Biological Diver-
sity from the Perspective of the North, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL Governance 188, 214-16 (Oran R. Young et al. eds.,. 1996) [hereinafter GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE]; see also Patricia Birnie, Regimes Dealing with the Oceans and All
Kinds of Seas from the Perspective of the North, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, supra, at
83-92. Both authors suggest that creation of a managing secretariat is an important
factor contributing to the "effectiveness" of international environmental agreements.
87. ROME STATUTE, supra note 6, at Part 7.
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prove that the actions of one or some individuals accounted for
the environmental desecration. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, sentencing is based on imprisonment, fines, and forfei-
ture of the proceeds of the crime.8" There does not appear to be
much room to compel restitution, remediation of blight, civil lia-
bility or, simply put, to clean up the environmental harm. With-
out the International Criminal Court being able to order such
remedies, the curative nature of the punishment for causing
"widespread, long-term and severe" damage to the natural envi-
ronment is limited at best. Although there is discussion in Arti-
cle 79 of the Rome Statute about transferring fines and assets
collected to a trust fund for the benefit of victims of the crime, 9
Article 79 does not directly address a situation where it is the
natural environment directly, and humanity only indirectly, that
bears the loss of the crime. As a result, there is cause for con-
cern not only that environmental crimes will be poorly cogniza-
ble under the International Criminal Court, but also that the
punishments for wrongdoing will not address the unique nature
of these crimes. This argument further supports an ecocide con-
vention administered, by its own secretariat and enforced by its
own court. It is important for such a court to be empowered to
decide on both criminal as well as civil matters.9 ° In order for
the decisions of this court to be implemented and executed, it
would have to be given jurisdiction over natural and legal per-
sons in all nation-states, together with governments themselves.
It would also be important for this court to be given injunctive
powers to stop violations from happening and to arrest future
breaches. The International Criminal Court does not appear to
have such a capacity. This absence of injunctive powers is an-
other reason why it may not be well-suited to adjudicate environ-
mental crimes.
More proactive and peremptory methods, however, also
need to be developed. After all, any finding of ecocide operates
only on an ex post facto basis; the environmental harm has already
88. Id. art. 77.
89. Id. art. 79.
90. It will be useful to develop principles of valuation and assessment so that any
civil liability awards not only compensate the aggrieved parties, but also accurately rec-
ognize the full extent of the harm to the environment.
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occurred.91 What is more important is to provide incentives not
to act in environmentally threatening ways in the first place.
Providing incentives will entail linkages beyond the legal con-
text. Examples include the creation of economic disincentives
to producing environmentally destructive weaponry, technology
transfers to assist developing countries to pursue national secur-
ity interests in a more environmentally friendly manner, and fi-
nancial assistance mechanisms.92 Integration to the trade and
investment context ought to create disincentives to peddle and
to manufacture the more environmentally injurious military
technology. One final linkage that is of considerable impor-
tance involves international peace-keeping or peace-enforce-
ment forces. These efforts could be mandated to ensure envi-
ronmental and humanitarian protection. Allotting these inter-
national forces a "green-keeping" mandate could help integrate
international environmental norms into an internecine conflict.
By way of example, were U.N. involvement in Somalia to have
had a "green-keeping" mandate, then practices of deforestation
and assaults on water purity that were commonplace in the con-
flict could have been addressed. Ultimately, the prevention of
ecocide cannot be disaggregated from the fact that environmen-
tal scarcity and resource depletion are often the cause of military
conflict.93 As a result, equipping nations to engage in proper
environmental management and sustainable development could
have the collateral benefit of mitigating military aggression.
CONCLUSION: GOING BEYOND MILITARY CONFLICT
The concept of ecocide ought not to be restricted to actual
91. See M.A. Drumbl, The General Agreement: From Tariffs and Trade to Sustainable
Development, 25 CAN. Bus. L.J. 357, 398 (1995).
92. One option that should be considered is the creation of an international insur-
ance scheme to fund environmental clean-up as a stop-gap measure until liability can
be conclusively determined. The financing of such a scheme could flow from interna-
tional contributions or taxes. See, e.g., Background Paper, supra note 9, at 18.
93. See McNeely, supra note 74. By way of example, the Rwandan conflict was
partly precipitated by demand for arable land. Over the past three decades, average
farm size has declined from two hectares per family to 0.7 hectares. On the relation-
ship between agricultural land-use and the Rwandan genocide, see Guenthar Baechler,
Rwanda: The Roots of Tragedy, Battle for Elimination on an Ethno-political and Ecological Ba-
sis, in ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AS A CAUSE OF WAR, Vol. II, 461-502 (1996); M.A.
Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's Genocide Trials,
(forthcoming 1998) COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
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war. In fact, it could apply to the pre-deployment and post-de-
ployment phases of armed forces activity. Drawing distinctions
between these phases and overt military conflict is a somewhat
artificial exercise. By way of example, capturing pre-deployment
military activity could oblige a nation to face international
ecocidal consequences for detonation and testing of nuclear de-
vices, clearly an issue of topical importance.94 Post-deployment
liability would cover activities such as the decommissioning of
weapons, for example Russian attempts to decommission its nu-
clear submarines in the Arctic that are currently being carried
out with insufficient financial and human resources and, as a
result, constitute a serious threat to the environment.
Ecocide could also apply in times of peace. Environmental
crime, most notably trade in endangered species, hazardous
wastes, and ozone-depleting substances, constitutes an under-
ground market estimated at US$20 billion annually.9" Peace-
time infractions of this nature ought also to be prosecuted
within the rubric of an international environmental court. In
the longer run, a prosecutor's office that could attach to the In-
ternational Criminal Court could receive a mandate to investi-
gate allegations of such transboundary environmental crimes.96
On another note, the forces of international financial ex-
pansion may also wreak havoc on the environment. 97 Particu-
larly troubling examples are the ongoing forest fires in the Ama-
zon Basin and in Indonesia. In both cases, there is compelling
evidence that these fires had been deliberately set by enterprises
seeking to clear the forests for economic development.9" The
effects on the environment are clear: immediate destruction, an
94. Of course, capturing pre-deployment military activity could prove to be quite a
barrier to obtaining international consensus.
95. 8 Countries Agree to Fight Environmental Crime, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1998, at A4.
There appears, for instance, to be an active illegal trade in freon from Canada to the
United States, with a view to supplying automobiles in the southern United States. Do-
mestic efforts to crack down on this illegal activity have only met with partial success.
An international environmental court may prove to be effective in this area.
96. Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott of Great Britain has suggested the crea-
tion of the "equivalent of an Interpol for environmental crime." See id.
97. McNeely contends that market forces may destroy more biodiversity than mili-
tary forces. McNeely, supra note 74. International criminal sanctions could constitute a
powerful device to mitigate the unsustainable and environmentally destructive effects of
these market forces.
98. John Klotz, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17, 1997, at A18. For the Indonesian context
alone, see Randy Lee Loftis, The Tropics Are on Fire, TORONTO STAR, June 6, 1998, at C6
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inability of ecosystem regeneration, and a contribution to global
warming. Such conduct ought to fall within an ecocide conven-
tion and be sanctioned by an international environmental court.
In the end, this destruction comes full circle and immediately
affects humanity: through death and disability owing to the ef-
fects of asthma and smog-related illnesses, and, in the case of the
Indonesian fires, creating smoke and haze that may have in-
duced a plane crash in Sumatra that took the lives of 234 peo-
ple.99 It remains an open question whether such conduct ought
to be conjunctively sanctioned by an international criminal
court. If so, an entente of understanding will have to be devel-
oped between the two courts to avoid situations of double jeop-
ardy and overlapping jurisdiction.
(stating that "evidence shows that settlers were being paid by large corporations to burn
forests to convert land into corporate-owned palm or rice plantations").
99. Loftis, supra note 98.
19981
